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European Irrationalities
Andreas Goldthau1
Abstract
The War on Iraq in has split the continent into ‘Old Europe’ and
‘New Europe’. On Iran, by contrast, the EU jointly acts in the
context of a coordinated European foreign policy. The paper argues
that both conflicts resemble an assurance game among the
Europeans, in which the entailed trust dilemma prevented involved
players from cooperating. It identifies the European ‘Dialogues’
with Iran as a regime that reduced information deficits in the case
of Iran. In the case of Iraq, however, European players were unable
to mutually judge whether there was a hidden agenda or not – and
thus opted for defection instead of cooperation.
Keywords: European foreign policy, nuclear conflict, WMD, Iran,
Iraq, assurance game, regime theory
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1. The puzzle of European Foreign Policy
European foreign policy approaches towards the Gulf are highly
ambivalent. In the case of the Iraq conflict, the continent was split
into ‘Old Europe’, i.e. Germany and France, and ‘New Europe’, i.e.
the UK, accompanied by Spain, Portugal, Italy and several EU
accession countries. Whereas ‘Old Europe’ opposed the war-prone
US approach towards Iraq, the ‘New Europeans’ joined or
supported a US-led ‘coalition of the willing’ that vanquished Iraq in
order to enforce UN Resolution 1441 and to dismantle the country
from assumed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in March/April
2003. The conflict over Iraq triggered a deep crisis within Europe
and also exerted negative side effects on the ongoing integration
process. Moreover, it heavily damaged a developing European
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and eviscerated the
UN as a global institution of conflict resolution. In the case of Iran,
however, the picture is a different one. As its neighbor country Iraq,
Iran is blamed to having established hidden nuclear plants and to
aspiring WMDs. It is, again, especially the USA that has for a long
time been strongly urging to condemn Iran in the UN Security
Council and to also consider military measures against the country.
In the case of Iran, however, the Europeans have obviously opted
for a joint and cooperative approach. In contrast to the US policy,
they rely on incentives and negotiations as the appropriate tools to
prevent Iran from acquiring WMDs. Moreover, they have accepted
an appeal of the Security Council and the use of force only as a last
resort option. The leading European countries in this process are the
so-called ‘EU 3’, i.e. Germany, France and the UK. Hence, in the
case of Iran, the cleavage is clearly between the US and Europe, and
not among the Europeans (Perkovich, 2004, Quille and Keane,
2005).
Obviously, there exists a fundamental difference with regards to the
European cooperation behavior in both crises: during the Iraq
conflict, Europe was deeply divided and did not manage to
formulate and implement a common foreign policy. In the case of
Iran, however, the Europeans speak with one voice and have
defined a common approach based on incentives and negotiations.
                                                                                                                
1 Dr. Andreas Goldthau, Transatlantic PostDoctoral Fellow, RAND Corporation.
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Moreover, the European states have jointly stood up for their
strategy towards Iran also vis-à-vis the US that has continuously
pushed for a tougher stance in the Security Council.
Both crises, moreover, share identical characteristics. First, the
dominating issue is weapons of mass destruction. In both cases, the
global community fears or feared that Iraq or Iran could operate an
offensive strike against Israeli or Western targets, or proliferate
WMDs to terrorist networks. Second, both cases were characterized
by a perceived ‘urgency’ that required action. Both Iraq and Iran
actively forged the development of production facilities that could
potentially be used to generate WMDs and publicly announced an
early operative status of these facilities. Third, both countries’
refused to collaborate with the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), the world’s nuclear watchdog, tried to circumvent the
provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its Additional
Protocol, and aimed at hiding their facilities from IAEA
inspections. Fourth, both Iraq and Iran are part of the ‘axis of evil’
as proclaimed by the US in January 2002. In a consequence, the US
foreign policy towards both countries follows principally similar
schemes, aiming at ‘prevent[ing] regimes that sponsor terror from
threatening America […] with weapons of mass destruction’
(White-House, 2002). Hence, the US has taken up an openly
confronting stance in both conflicts. In a nutshell, while the main
characteristics of both crises can be hold constant, the Europeans
acted fundamentally different in both cases. The obvious puzzle can
thus be framed as follows: why do the Europeans cooperate over
Iran but fail to do so over Iraq, given that both crises occur in the
same policy field, entail similar characteristics and take place in
comparable conditions?
Both crises have been addressed extensively in newspapers and
policy debates. Common lines of arguments during the Iraq crisis
referred to the catchy phrases of a ‘war on oil’, of ‘Old Europe’s
attempts to ‘counterbalance the US’ or of ‘Schroeder’s last chance’
to win upcoming federal elections counted for lost. On Iran, by
contrast, spectators argued that there has been a ‘learning effect’
among the Europeans due to the ‘wake-up call’ stemming from the
Iraq case; that central (and hawkish) actors, namely UK’s Blair,
have lost their powerful domestic position they had during the Iraq
crisis; or that the Europeans have finally come to make an attempt
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to save what’s left of the CFSP after Europe had fallen into two
camps over Iraq (Renner, 2003, Helm, 2002, Ibrahim, 1997, RIA-
Novosti, 2005, Kramer, 2003, Conetta, 2003, van Ham, 2004, Hill,
2004, Menon, 2004). Obviously, either neorealism inspired or
domestic structure guided perspectives provide the underlying
theoretical basis of these lines of arguments and dominate the
debate.
In what follows, a first section – explicitly briefly – examines
whether neorealist and domestic structure perspectives provide
satisfying explanations to the puzzle, and discusses their
shortcomings. A second section then presents an alternative, game
theory based view on the puzzle by suggesting that both crises
constituted a mutual trust dilemma for the Europeans which had to
overcome in order to achieve Pareto. It is then argued that the
European ‘Dialogues’ with Iran constituted a regime that enabled
the Europeans to reduce information asymmetries. In a
consequence, they opted for cooperation and achieved a collectively
optimal outcome in the case of Iran. A third section shortly
discusses the results.
2. The failure of mainstream explanations
In both crises, there is a case for a neorealist argument. Cross-case,
however, neorealism does not have explanatory power.
2.1 The neorealist perspective
From a third image perspective, the conflicts on Iraq and Iran entail
all characteristics of a neorealist model: states are the central actors
during the crisis and thus the primary unity of analysis; national
interests dominate over multi- or supranational arrangements such
as the CFSP; and the predominant character of international order
during the crises is best described as anarchic (Crowe, 2003, Wood,
2003). In neorealism, rational cost-benefit maximizing states may
either opt for a balancing strategy, or pursue bandwagoning with
the hegemon (Waltz, 1979, Keohane, 1986, Gilpin, 1981, Grieco,
1993, Walt, 1985). From that perspective, the emergence of an ‘axis
Paris–Berlin–Moscow’ during the Iraq crisis must be seen as an
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attempt of France, Germany and Russia to balance the US that
aimed at expanding its hegemonic power also on the Middle East.
Great Britain, Spain and the ‘New Europeans’, by contrast, opted
for a bandwagoning strategy with the hegemon and entered the
hegemon-led ‘coalition of the willing’. As for the case of Iran, there
also is a coalition, though a different one, consisting of Great
Britain, Germany and France (EU 3), a leading group of Europeans
that is explicitly backed by the rest of the EU. Here, a neorealist
interpretation would suggest an attempt to balance the hegemon,
e.g. as a reaction on changed power constellations strengthening the
US position in the Middle East.
Hence, if each case was examined individually, the picture can be
called in line with neorealist assumptions: in the case of Iraq,
observed alliances may be grasped in neorealist terms (with a single
caveat lying in the fact that it remains unclear, why Great Britain
and the ‘New Europeans’ opted for bandwagoning and did not join
Germany and France in their ‘Eurasian balancing efforts’).2 Also in
the case of Iran, neorealism makes a point in that observed
European coalitions may be regarded as rational responses of states
towards changes on the systemic level. From a cross-case
perspective, however, neorealism entirely loses explanatory power.
Both crises yield different coalitions and strategies of involved
players at identical underlying conditions. The observed difference
in cooperative behavior does obviously not follow materialist
logics. There is no reason why Great Britain, for instance, should
give up its bandwagoning strategy in the case of Iran, a strategy that
has led to relative power gains in the case of Iraq.
In sum, neorealism provides a suitable theoretical instrument to
analytically grasp cooperation for each of both cases individually. It
however fails to provide an answer to the puzzle this paper aims to
address, i.e. why both crises trigger different coalitions among the
Europeans, given their similar characteristics.
                                                 
2 Please note that it is not the War on Iraq that is to be explained here from a
neorealist perspective, but the observed coalitions. As Mearsheimer and Walt
(2002) have convincingly argued, US policy during the Iraq crisis contradicted
neorealist policy imperatives. See also Soederblum (2003).
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1.2. The domestic structure perspective
Liberal domestic structure approaches to international relations
offer a different perspective to a country’s external behavior. They
principally assume that there exists a close link between a country’s
foreign policy choices and the domestic environment, i.e. they open
up the ‘black box’. As a consequence of locating the driver of
foreign policy on a second image or sub-state level, a country’s
foreign policy goals as well as its preferences towards cooperation
depend on interests of domestic groups (Moravcsik, 1993,
Moravcsik, 1997, Risse-Kappen, 1991, Deudney and Ikenberry,
1999).
From a domestic structure perspective, the foreign policy choices of
European states in the cases of Iraq and Iran would thus be a
function of specific interests of strong domestic pressure groups. At
the same time, such a liberal theory of national preference building
does not directly allow conclusions on when states cooperate. It
however defines a clear condition that has to be fulfilled in order to
render cooperation in a given policy field possible: the main
interests of (dominant) domestic pressure groups in involved
countries have to coincide. Thus, with regards to an identical
externality – like the ones given in the cases of Iraq and Iran –,
powerful domestic groups in all European countries have to
individually either expect gains or fear losses in order to make
cooperation the preferred policy choice.3
Departing from these principal statements, the following
hypothetical observations must hold true if a domestic structure
perspective was valid: during the Iraq crisis, important domestic
groups in Germany and France (and Russia) must have feared
potential costs caused by political change in the Middle East due to
a US invasion, whereas important domestic groups in Great Britain
must have expected gains. In the case of Iran, by contrast, powerful
domestic groups in Germany, France AND Great Britain must have
feared potential costs caused by a major political change due to US
invasion. Obviously, with regards to the above cited common lines
of arguments, the two dominant groups that are central to this
                                                 
3 For a classical article on the second image reversed perspective see Gourevitch
(1978).
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analysis are economic actors in the oil and gas sector, and the
public. Whereas the former may expect losses or gains resulting
from a redistribution of property rights in two of the word’s major
hydrocarbon producing countries, the latter may suffer from
psychological or social costs. Notably the German public has
repeatedly expressed its preference for a peaceful solution to both
crises, which is often seen as a result of a German pacifist identity
developed since World War II. As all concerned European countries
are democracies, the public is identical to the electorate, i.e. the
most powerful domestic pressure group a government may face.
As a quick empirical test reveals, a domestic structure perspective
however does not explain the puzzle. As obvious in Table 1,
activities of major European oil and gas companies in the Gulf do
not suggest that the mandatory set of domestic interests existed.
While France’s TotalFinaElf is active in Iraq and Iran, German oil
and gas companies are not part of drilling consortia or involved in
pipeline projects in either country. British companies are active only
in Iran, however at comparably small scale. Germany therefore
simply lacked a domestic pressure group in the oil and gas business
that could have expected gains or should have feared losses in both
crises. In a consequence, there is no empirical reason to assume
coinciding domestic interests in Germany and France, the major
European allies during the Iraq crisis opposing the war-prone
approach of the US. Also with regards to France and Great Britain,
there is no potential cause for a varying degree of cooperation of
both countries over Iraq and Iran, as activities of domestic French
and British oil and gas companies are similar in both cases.
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Table 1: Foreign oil and gas companies active in Iraq/Iran
Iraq (pre-war) Iran
France: TotalFinaElf
Germany: None
UK: None
Spain: Repsol
Russia: Lukoil; Zarubezhneft;
Stroitransgaz; Tatneft; Slavneft
Other: BHP (Australia); South Korean
Consortium (South Korea); Agip
(Italy); Eni (Italy); Sonatrach
(Algeria); ONGC (India); TPAO
(Turkey); Japex (Japan); CNPC
(China); PetroVietnam (Vietnam);
Pertamina (Indonesia)
France: TotalFinaElf
Germany: None
UK: BG Group; BP Iran
Spain: CESPA, Respol
Russia: Lukoil; Gazprom
Other: The ABB Group (Switzerland);
Shell Iran (The Netherlands/UK);
Ultramar (Canada); Bow Valley
(Canada); Petro Canada (Canada); Eni
(Italy); Japex (Japan); JNOC (Japan);
INPEX (Japan); BHP Billiton
(Australia); LG (Korea Republic);
Lundin Petroleum AB (Sweden); Petrom
(Romania); Petronas (Malaysia); Statoil
(Norway); Norsk Hydro (Norway)
Notes: figures for 2002; listing not according to volume of engagement
Sources: (EIA, 2006a, EIA, 2006b).
What about the related ‘war on oil’ argument? Oil and gas
companies that have not been active in the Gulf may arguably have
an interest to take part in the zero sum game over scarce resources
and high profits, and thus actively push for a redistribution of
property rights. Such a perspective would imply that German and
British companies, both not present in Iraq, have quite coinciding
interest on Iraq, and would thus assumably rather push for
cooperation than for confrontation. Moreover, due to similar
interests of domestic British companies in Iraq and Iran, the
expected British behavior during both crises would assumably be
rather similar, too. Empirically, this was obviously not the case.
Finally, even when taking into account trade volumes as well, there
is no case for a domestic structure argument.
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Table 2: Main trading partners
 Iraq (2002)  Iran (2004)
 Main export partners (% of total)  Main export partners (% of total) 
US: 30%
France: 16%
Spain: 11%
Italy: 9%
Japan: 19%
China: 10%
Italy: 6%
South Africa: 6%
 Main import partners (% of total)  Main import partners (% of total)
France: 21%   
Australia: 16%   
US: 9%  
China: 9% 
Germany: 12%
France: 8%
China: 8% 
UAE: 7%
Sources: (EIU, 2005a, EIU, 2005b).
As can be seen in Table 2, France held a large share in Iraq’s pre-
war imports, whereas Germany is Iran’s largest import trading
partner. Great Britain is no relevant trading partner of either
country. Hence, there is no reason to assume coinciding domestic
interests in Germany and France in both conflicts, and no
explanatory potential for differing domestic British interests in both
cases.
In sum, a domestic structure perspective does not offer an
explanation to the puzzle if domestic oil and gas companies are
taken into account. What about the public, though? During the Iraq
crisis, a clear anti-war sentiment can be stated in all European
countries. In Germany, 89 % were opposed to war without UN
support, 61 % even with UN support. A similar picture can be found
in France (87 %/73 %), Spain (87 %/ 87%), and even in Great
Britain (80 %/ 61%) (EOS-Gallup-International, 2003).4 Hence,
while European leaders were greatly divided over Iraq, European
citizens were overwhelmingly united in rejecting military action. In
the case of Iran, the situation is comparable, though less mediated.
Obviously, the explanation to different coalitions in both conflicts
does not lie in differing degrees of public support in European
                                                 
4 See also Wood (2003), 4f.
Andreas Goldthau: Divided over Iraq, united over Iran 49
countries. As spectators have however argued, some European
governments were able to ignore public opinion, whereas others
have not managed to. The explanatory variable may thus lie in
differing degrees of freedom of the government from the public,
which may vary over time. The ‘agent government’ may for
instance able to ignore its principal (the public) if the latter is not
able to replace the agent immediately. From that perspective, a
strong agent ‘British government’ was arguably able to sideline
public opinion during the Iraq crisis, but too weak during the Iran
crisis to act similarly. The German government, by contrast, a very
weak agent during the Iraq crisis, arguably had no choice but to
listen to his principal during the Iraq crisis.5 In the case of Iran, it
was however able to accept force and military actions as a last
resort against Iran if the nuke talks fail.
Crucially, to be valid, such an explanation requires a distinct time
lag between both crises. However, as can be seen in Table 3 in the
appendix, and in contrast to public awareness, the crises over Iraq
and Iran cannot be clearly separated since the most important
decisions on actions on both countries were taken among the
Europeans nearly at the same time. Some anecdotal evidence shall
illustrate this claim: in June 2002, the Europeans commonly agreed
on a set of conditionalities vis-à-vis Iran, while at the same time the
German government openly declared its pacifist stance towards
Iraq. In October 2002, Germany, France and Great Britain jointly
established the ‘Human Rights Dialogue’ with Iran and started talks
on an EU-Iranian ‘Trade- and Cooperation Agreement’ in
December 2002. Moreover, the Europeans jointly declared that a
pre-condition for proceeding trade talks was that Iran cooperated in
the conflict over its nuclear program. All this took place only days
before the éclat between Great Britain and France in the UN
Security Council. In June 2003, only three months after the
establishment of the much debated ‘axis Paris-Berlin-Moscow’ on
the Iraq issue, the EU declared Iran’s efforts of nuclear rearmament
and trade as interdependent, and decided to accept force as a final
means to  prevent the proliferation of WMDs. Hence, in a nutshell,
the difference in both crises is not time. By contrast, both conflicts
                                                 
5 Schroeder’s categorical ‘No’ on military actions against Iraq has commonly
been regarded as his ‘last chance’ to win federal polls.
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rather coincide. One crisis, however, ends up in discord among the
Europeans, while the other crisis is tackled in a cooperative way.
Hence, any argument that refers to federal elections in Germany, the
Kelly affair or the Butler report in Great Britain, or to other
contingent factors that may have changed the relative power of the
government vis-à-vis his principal, is not valid. And, to complete
the picture, neither are explanations recurring to ‘learning effects’
among the Europeans after the diplomatic disaster during the Iraq
crisis. In order to learn, actors need time. Time, however, is what
they did not have.
In sum: realist and domestic structure approaches entail explanatory
power for some aspects of the examined crises. From a comparative
perspective, however, they do not provide a satisfying explanation
to the puzzle.
3. Cooperation During Crises: A European Trust Dilemma
Having rejected the common explanations to differing European
cooperation behavior during the crises over Iraq and Iran, this
section now develops an alternative view on the puzzle. In the
following, state behavior is modeled from a game theory
perspective. In a second step, it is embedded in a regime theoretical
framework. The basic argument is that observed state behavior
during both crises constituted an individually rational response to a
trust dilemma among the Europeans.
3.1 The assurance game
From a game theoretic perspective, the behavior of involved
European states during both crises must be regarded as a social
problem among (unitary) state players interacting on the
international level. Calculating costs against benefits, they opt for
the rationally best strategy to maximize their individual hierarchy of
preferences. Preferences of players over outcomes are assumed to
be stable, i.e. actors’ interests do not change. Given these principal
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premises, the basic characteristics of both crises are now identified
and transferred into a game theoretic model of interaction.6
Let’s first grasp the interests (i.e. preferences over outcomes) of
involved European states and the setting in which they play. First,
and most important, all players have an interest to prevent potential
threats emerging from Iraq’s and Iran’s efforts to go nuclear or to
produce material that can be used for WMDs. This interest is driven
by a rational actor’s principal urge for survival.7 Second, it must be
assumed that all involved players aim at achieving their goals at an
optimal cost-benefit ratio. This implies that they arguably aim to
minimize costs, in monetary terms as well as with regards to the
common social environment, i.e. existing institutions of collective
security (e.g. UN or CFSP). In other words: it can be assumed that
player will prefer a solution to the security problem that leaves
relations to allies unharmed and takes places within a legitimizing
institutional framework compared to a solution that establishes
security but generates collateral damage. Further, as stated earlier in
this paper, the settings of both crises can be regarded as almost
identical. In both cases, the Europeans face a threat to their
individual (and collective) security, while all relevant characteristics
as well as external factors, namely the US approach towards both
countries, can be hold constant. Put differently, the Europeans play
the same ‘crisis game’ in both cases. For the sake of parsimony,
let’s finally assume that there are only two players involved in the
‘crisis game’, France and Great Britain. This assumption is
admittedly reductive but empirically valid, since all other ‘Old’ or
‘New’ European states have clustered around one of these two
major players during the Iraq crisis.8 In the given ‘crisis game’,
each player can either chose to cooperate in order to re-establish his
security, or he can opt for unilateral action, i.e. defect.
                                                 
6 For game theoretic approaches to international politics see, among others, the
contributions of Arthur Stein and Duncan Snidal in Baldwin (1993). See also
Stein (1982); Snidal (1985).
7 Please note that all European states assumably have identical preferences over
outcomes, but not necessarily over the means to achieve these outcomes.
8 Modeling France and Great Britain as the two major players in the European
crisis game moreover mirrors the fact that these countries are the only European
states to legitimize collective action in the Security Council.
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Obviously, as follows from the settings of the given ‘crisis game’
and the players’ preferences over outcomes, both involved players
gain most by mutually cooperating. Cooperation increases the
probability to prevent Iraq and Iran from producing or proliferating
WMDs and to re-establish individual security. At the same time,
this goal is achieved at individually lower costs as both players can
agree on burden sharing, do not risk damaging their mutual
relationship and leave their common social environment (i.e. the
EU), unharmed. Each player can also achieve security by acting
individually, however at individually higher costs. Hence, expressed
in game theoretic terms, the crisis game resembles a stag hunt
situation (also termed assurance game), in which mutual
cooperation generates the individually and collectively highest
benefits.
Figure 1 illustrates the European stag hunt situation in a game
matrix.
Figure 1: The ‘Crisis Game’
GB (+NE)
cooperate
act
unilaterally
cooperate
4
(P, N)
4
1
3
F (+OE)
act
unilaterally
3
1
2
(N, MaxiMin)
2
Notes:  F: France; GB: Great Britain; OE: Old Europe; NE: New Europe; N:
Nash; P: Pareto; MaxiMin: ‘play safe’
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Since each player gains most by cooperating, he is awarded a payoff
of 4 in Figure 1, whereas unilateral action is depicted as the second
best option, generating a payoff of 2 for each player. As the
individually optimal strategies at the same time generate the
collectively best outcome in the game, this situation constitutes not
only a Nash equilibrium but also the Pareto optimal solution. In
other words, and reflecting above statements on individually
optimal choices: no player can do any better than cooperating.
Obviously, no player has an incentive to leave the equilibrium, i.e.
to act unilaterally in the given setting. However, and small wonder,
the matrix exactly grasps the situations that can be observed during
the Iraq and Iran crises: the lower right cell depicts unilateral action
of the two main players (France or Great Britain plus the ‘New’ or
‘Old Europeans clustered around them) during the Iraq crisis,
whereas the upper left cell depicts the cooperation of the Europeans
in the case of Iran. The game matrix thus precisely mirrors the
puzzle as laid out earlier. Hence, the latter can now be reframed as
follows: given identical games, what made it rational for involved
players to opt for a lower individual (and collective) payoff during
the Iraq crisis and to achieve security at comparably higher costs by
sacrificing inner-European relations and common institutions of
collective security?
A first step towards a solution of this riddle is the nature of
assurance games: involved players have to cope with a trust
dilemma. If either of the involved player fears that the other does
not have the preferences over outcomes he claims to have,
temptation arises to defect. This is due to the fact that, if his true
interests were different than the claimed ones, the second player
would not maximize his payoffs by cooperating and may thus
pursue unilateral action as his real dominant strategy. The first
player would thus end up in the worst possible situation by
cooperating, receiving a payoff of 1, whereas the second player
receives 3. Player one thus has an incentive to act unilaterally. In
order to illustrate this point, let’s assume, for instance, that F alleges
that GB’s highest preference is not to implement UN Resolution
1441 and to enforce disarmament of Iraq (as claimed), but to
achieve a regime change. If it cooperated, F would have to fear that
GB defects, which would lead both players to the lower left cell. F
would end up with a payoff of 1, whereas GB would have realized a
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payoff of 3. Put in a nutshell: if individual stakes in the game are
high and insecurities are strong, there is a strong incentive for both
players to ‘play safe’, i.e. to opt for a ‘MaxiMin Strategy’ and
accept the lower payoff of 2.
Obviously, each player’s strategy depends on how reliable his
information on the other’s preferences over outcomes is. The less
information asymmetries or insecurities are in the game, the higher
the chance that both players opt for cooperation and not for the safe
MaxiMin strategy. Hence, the question arises, what in fact
distinguishes the ‘assurance game Iran’ from the ‘assurance game
Iraq’ and helped involved European players to overcome the
entailed trust dilemma. A ‘classical’ mechanism to lower
information deficits is an institutionalized forum of interaction. The
next section thus embeds the rational choice argument in the frame
of a regime.
3. Overcoming the Trust Dilemma: The Power of Regimes
As stated above, a high degree of information on the players’
mutual preferences over outcomes renders a Pareto optimal solution
of the assurance game more likely. Hence, from a game theoretic
perspective, the explanatory factor that distinguishes the crisis
games on Iraq and Iran must lie in a variance of information on both
sides. The main argument of the following section is that, in the
case of Iran, there existed an international regime that strengthened
mutual expectations among involved European players on their true
interest and their commitment: the ‘Critical (later: Constructive)
Dialogue’ (CD).9 This regime, as will be argued, provided a forum
of mutual exchange and forced the Europeans to reveal individual
preferences over outcomes. By briefly tracing the process of
establishing and implementing the CD since the early nineties, this
section will show how the regime exerted observable effects on the
cooperation behavior of involved European states. As will be
revealed, at least one major incident before the crisis on nuclear
activities and WMDs has required mutual assurance of the
                                                 
9 On the role of regimes in international relations see, among others, Rittberger,
Hasenclever and Mayer (1997) and Oye (1986).
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Europeans on their individual preferences over outcomes and has
thus rendered a cooperative approach possible during the present
nuclear dispute. Conversely, as there was no such regime in the case
of Iraq, involved players were arguably not sure on mutual
preferences, which led to a different outcome in an identical
assurance game.
According to Krasner, a regime consists of ‘principles, norms, rules,
and decision making procedures around which actors expectations
converge in a given issue-area’ (Krasner, 1983). The CDs of the
Europeans with Iran entailed all of these elements, targeting the
issue-area ‘interaction between Western democracies and
authoritarian regimes in mutually critical policy fields’. In 1992, the
European Council in its Edinburgh Declaration established the
‘Critical Dialogue’ as the official EU policy approach towards Iran.
This first ‘Dialogue’ was principally designed as a forum to foster
mutual exchange between the Europeans (read: all EU member
states) and Iran. In line with overall tenor of European policy after
the fall of the Iron Curtain, primary topics of the dialogues were
soft security issues, namely human rights, terrorism, drug
trafficking and organized crime (Calabrese, 2004). The issue of
production and proliferation of WMDs was always part of the
discussed topics as well, however became prominent on top of the
dialogue’s agenda only by the end of the 1990s. The CD involved
measures on both the European level as well as on member state
level. On EU level, the most important instruments comprised semi-
annual meetings of the EU Troika with Iranian officials, démarches
and public declarations of the Council of Ministers (Carbonell,
2004, Struwe, 1998).
As several spectators have argued, the principal achievement of the
dialogues was not to create rules and enforce policy change, but to
establish a forum of exchange on topics of mutual concern, aiming
at re-integrating Iran into the international community (Posch, 2006,
Kutchesfahani, 2006, Struwe, 1998). Hence, as the degree of formal
institutionalization of the ‘dialogues’ was low and conditionalities
were vague, the regime was all but ‘thick’.10 With regards to the
European problem of a mutual trust dilemma, however, the dialogue
                                                 
10 On a detailed assessment of the ‘Dialogue’, see, among others, Reissner (2000),
and Taylor (2000).
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entailed an important component: the Europeans had to necessarily
meet regularly and coordinate their actions towards Iran. In that
respect, the CD acted as a double regime. On the one side, it
brought Europe and Iran at one table. On the other hand, it forced
the Europeans to reveal and align their mutual interests in order to
act in a unitary way vis-à-vis Iran. In other words, for the
Europeans, the main function of the Critical Dialogue was to
provide a forum of repeated interaction in which they were able to
get a robust picture of their mutual preferences.11
A first test case for the ability of the Europeans to act collectively
towards Iran occurred with the ‘Mykonos verdict’ in April 1997. A
German court had found Iranian state authorities guilty of having
initiated the assassination of Iranian dissidents in a Greek restaurant
in Berlin back in 1992. In a consequence, all EU member states
collectively withdrew their ambassadors and sent them back only by
the end of the year. During that period, bilateral visits were also
considerably reduced. The CD itself was suspended by the EU. In
addition, the Council of Ministers confirmed its calling on Iran to
adhere to ‘its commitments under international agreements,
including those concerning the nonproliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, as well as those concerning human rights’ (Struwe,
1998). With regards to the stag hunt situation, the common
withdrawal of ambassadors and the coordination of bilateral actions
towards Iran thereafter must be regarded as nothing but a –
successful – mutual assurance among the Europeans over their
individual preferences.
In February 1998, the European Council re-established diplomatic
contacts with Iran on a ministerial level and restarted a
‘Comprehensive Dialogue’ replacing the suspended ‘Critical
Dialogue’ in March 1998.12 The term ‘comprehensive’ explicitly
reflected the broad range of topics at stake. Especially the issues of
human rights and proliferation became more prominent than before.
In 1999, a ‘High-level Working Group on Energy and Transport’,
and in October 2000, a ‘Working Group on Trade and Investment’
                                                 
11 On overcoming trust dilemmas via repeated interaction see, among others,
Kimbrough (2005).
12 Interestingly, these developments have taken place under the British EU
presidency.
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was established. In February 2001, the Commission issued an
official note suggesting the Council extends EU relations with Iran
(EUCom, 2001). In June 2002, the Council concluded that WMDs
are one of four central areas of concern in the EU’s relations with
Iran, among terrorism, human rights issues, and Iran’s role in the
Middle East Peace Process. The Council also paved the way for
negotiations on an EU-Iran Trade and Cooperation Agreement
(TCA) and defined clear conditionalities that have to be met by
Iran. From this point onwards, the EU regarded trade talks and
cooperative behavior of the Iran in above mentioned key areas as
interdependent issues (Carbonell, 2004, EC, 2003).
Hence, when the Iran dispute started to become ‘hot’ in August
2002 following the discovery of non-declared nuclear plants in
Natanz and Arak, all European actors had a clear picture of their
real mutual preferences and knew that they all had identical
interests and expectations on Iran (and its efforts to go nuclear).
Having mutually revealed their interests and aligned their strategies
during a process having spanned a period of more than 10 years, the
Europeans were able to overcome the trust dilemma and to
individually opt for a cooperative strategy.  Hence, in October 2002,
the Council established the ‘Human Rights Dialogue’ with Iran and
started intensive negotiations on the TCA with Iran in December
2002, i.e. at the very point in time the inner-European dispute over
Iraq was about to culminate (EUCom, 2002). In June 2003, the
Council urged Iran to unconditionally sign the IAEA Additional
Protocol. The Council also stated that the use of force must be
envisaged as a last resort to prevent the proliferation of WMDs.
Especially from a German point of view, this decision constitutes a
fundamental difference to the standpoint adopted in the case of Iraq.
At the IAEA Board Meeting in September 2003, the EU issued a
common statement on Iran. Moreover, Great Britain, France and
Germany commonly presented a joint draft resolution to the IEAE
board (Carbonell, 2004). Now acting as ‘EU-3’ on behalf of all EU-
Europeans, the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, France and
Germany visited Iran in October 2003. In the resulting ‘Tehran
Agreement’, they achieved a freeze of Iran’s nuclear activities and
the signature of the Additional Protocol to the NPT (IAEA, 2003).
It is important to note that the crucial point here does not lie in the
question whether or not the Europeans have been able to prevent
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Iran from going nuclear. Rather, it consists in the fact that they
acted in a cooperative manner ever since the crisis on Iran’s nuclear
program started in 2002.13 In a nutshell: the Europeans have
managed to achieve the Pareto efficient equilibrium of the game,
i.e. ended up in the upper left cell of the game matrix and realized
the highest collective and individual payoff. Great Britain favors
negotiations and a multilateral approach, and stands by the
European strategy even when the US repeatedly tried to initiate a
resolution on Iran in the Security Council (Allen-Mills, 2005).
Germany, as indicated above, accepts the use of force as a means to
prevent WMD proliferation. And France early and quickly adopted
a clear position, which contrasts its numerous maneuvers in order to
escape a clear commitment to either side during the Iraq crisis
(Kempin, 2003).
In the case of Iraq, by contrast, there existed no forum of interaction
that may have served to close the information gap among involved
Europeans players. In a consequence, mutual insecurities on the
‘true’ policy goals prevailed, as became obvious in various
statements during the Iraq crisis. GB’s Blair, alleging in early 2003
that France pursues an ‘appeasement’ policy towards Iraq,
expressed doubts that France’s real policy goal is to disarm Iraq
(Wintour, 2003). And Germany’s Fischer, by articulating his now-
famous ‘Sorry, I am not convinced!’ at the Munich Security Forum
in February 2003, did not primarily call into question the validity of
the ‘proves’ on Iraq’s WMD activities presented by GB and the US;
rather, he expressed doubts on the underlying motives of the war
proponents. Hence, from this perspective, the dispute on the means
– tough resolution of the Security Council versus negotiations; more
or less time for Hans Blix’ investigations – at its core essentially
reveals a strong insecurity among the Europeans on true mutual
preferences over outcomes. Given the stakes all players had in the
game, this led to an individual MaxiMin strategy of the Europeans
and thus to a collectively suboptimal outcome. In a result, they
ended up in the lower right cell, an equilibrium yielding an
individually and collectively suboptimal payoff.
                                                 
13 For an overview of events after 2003 see Table 3 in the Appendix.
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4. Conclusion
This contribution addressed the puzzle of different degrees of
cooperation among the European states during the crises of Iraq and
Iran. A short test of realist and domestic structure approaches
revealed that common interpretations of European behavior during
both crises do not provide a satisfying explanation to the puzzle. It
then presented an alternative view on the topic by grasping
European behavior from a game theoretic perspective. Having
characterized the situations of the Iraq and Iran crises as an
assurance game, it further argued that information deficits may lead
to a lack of trust in these ‘crisis games’. Finally, it identified the
regime of the European ‘Dialogues’ with Iran as a mechanism to
overcome information asymmetries.
To sum up, what are the implications of this game theory based
perspective on a joint European approach in foreign and security
policy? First, the CFSP, a rather lose forum, is obviously not able to
reduce information asymmetries or deficits in case of a major crisis
that has the potential to affect the (national) security of European
states. Hence, as soon as a cooperation problem emerges like the
ones addressed in this paper, the CFSP does not render common
action possible and thus leads to a collectively optimal solution. As
the model implies, there needs to be an additional element to trigger
a cooperative approach: issue-specific regimes.14 If they exist, the
lose forum called CFSP is able to generate common policies. If not,
mutual distrust may also in the future prevent joint solutions, even if
they are collectively reasonable.
                                                 
14 Please note that this does not imply that the EU will be successful in what she
is doing. This simply implies that it will be done in a cooperative manner, i.e. in
the framework of an emerging CFSP.
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